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When social benets cannot be measured, a hybrid organization which se-
lects managers based on motivation can be used to balance prots with a social
purpose. This paper develops a model of social enterprise based on selection
of citizen-managers with this goal in mind. It develops the implications of
matching between founders and managers based on their preferences for the
mission. The main trade-o¤s suggested by the theory are tested experimen-
tally and these are used to calibrate a matching outcome. This makes precise
the parameter range in which social enterprises based on selection will be ob-
served in a market setting; we show that they achieve gains in e¢ ciency of
around 10% over non-prot enterprise.
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1 Introduction
While the pursuit of prot and private reward can generate wealth and benets in
the form of new goods and gains in economic e¢ ciency, there are many well-known
downsides to prot-seeking activities. So how to structure rms to balance prots
with social purpose remains an open question.
At one extreme, non-prot rms adopt a rigid mission which commits them to
the pursuit of a well-dened good cause, the ultra vires principle. Such organizations
play an important role in some sectors of the economy such as health and education.
A predominant view is that the non-prot form reduces the freedom among managers
to pursue private ends, as emphasized in Hansmann (1980) and Glaeser and Shleifer
(2001) among others. However, it is often suggested that non-prots can also benet
by selecting employees who are committed to the cause as observed by Weisbrod
(1988) who notes that
Non-prot organizations may act di¤erently from private rms not
only because of the constraint on distributing prot but also, perhaps,
because the motivations and goals of managers and directors ... di¤er. If
some non-prots attract managers whose goals are di¤erent from those
managers in the proprietary sector, the two types of organizations will
behave di¤erently.(page 31).
Managers in such instances can be called motivated agents(Besley and Ghatak,
2005, and Benabou and Tirole, 2006).
Standard for prot rms also have a rigid mission, to maximize the prot of
their owners. This may be reinforced by selecting managers who care solely about
money  the usual homo economicus assumption. These managers are rewarded
with bonuses based on protability to encourage e¤ort.
But, there is increasing interest in hybrid forms of organization, often referred to
as social enterprises. Even though, as Martin and Osberg (2007) acknowledge,
there are many di¤erent types of rms which travel under this banner, the mantra of
social enterprise is to balance making prots with a social mission (Katz and Page,
2010).1 This eschews the rigidity of either non-prot or for-prot enterprise. Despite
great interest in the topic of social enterprise, we do not have an economic framework
to analyze them. This paper aims to ll this gap.
To be e¤ective, social enterprises have to solve the problem of achieving the
right trade-o¤ between the dual objectives of prot and purpose. We call this the
mission integrity problem. One solution would be to contract with managers to
ensure this. But, as in the classic multi-tasking problem of Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991), many aspects of performance are hard to measure, especially those that
1Terms like public benet corporations(Shiller, 2012), social enterprise(Dees, 1998, Born-
stein, 2004) or social business(Yunus, 2007) are part of the lexicon but all stand for somewhat
di¤erent organizational forms.
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determine the realization social benets.2 There is a therefore a role for what Katz
and Page (2010) call mission-sympathetic partieswho we refer to here as citizen-
managerswho are appointed to achieve an optimal trade-o¤ between mission and
prot. When social benets cannot be measured, a hybrid organization which
selects managers based on motivation can be used to achieve mission integrity.
This paper develops a model of social enterprise based on selection of citizen-
managers who balance prot with purpose. The model has four key features. First,
protability and social payo¤s sometimes diverge; however, only prot can be mea-
sured or contracted upon. Second, the enterprise requires a manager to put in
e¤ort to improve overall e¢ ciency, as well as to decide whether to pursue prot or
social purpose in its key decisions depending on the situation (the mission integrity
problem). Third, organization design determines whether there is a rigid mission
or it is left to the discretion of the manager, and the allocation of any residual cash
ow. Fourth, rms or foundersemploy managers who are heterogeneous in terms
of how much they care about the mission and who are selected from a competitive
labor market.
We focus on three organizational forms: for prots, non-prots, and social enter-
prises. With a for-prot or social enterprise, the manager is a full residual claimant
on prots, whereas with a non-prot the managers wage is at. For-prots and
non-prots curb the autonomy of managers by stipulating the mission. In a social
enterprise, the manager has discretion over the balance of prots and purpose.
The heterogeneiy of motivation of managers plays an important role in our analy-
sis. We show that in a social enterprise, for low motivation and high motivation
managers, mission integrity is not achieved - they always choose the pro-prot or pro-
social mission, but for moderately motivated managers mission integrity is achieved.
The e¤ort level in a social enterprise is (weakly) higher than in a for-prot or a non-
prot, strictly so for moderately motivated managers. In terms of mission choice and
e¤ort, for low motivation managers, for-prots and social enterprises are equivalent,
and for high motivation managers, non-prots and social enterprises are equivalent.
The choice of organizational form depends on the motivation of both the man-
ager and the founder. Depending on how motivated the founder is, for managers
with either low or high motivation, the choice will be between a for-prot or a non-
prot, and for managers with moderate motivation, the choice will be between a
social enterprise and non-prot. We provide a condition for founders and managers
to match assortatively: highly motivated founders hire motivated managers in non-
prots, low motivation founders hire low motivation managers in for-prots while
moderately motivated founders hire moderately motivated managers in either social
enterprises or non-prots. In an extension, we allow founders to put a negative
weight on the social mission, in which case the managers motivation becomes sim-
2At the time of writing, 20 US states have passed laws recognizing benet corporations as
distinct legal entities. In the UK, the law was changed to allow the formation of Community
Interest Companies which are similar in spirit to B-corporations. These attempt to solve the
mission integrity problem through contracts.
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ilar to private benets in standard agency models and for-prots that stipulate a
rigid mission to maximize nancial prots, may be preferred to non-prots or social
enterprise.
To test the underlying ideas of the theory, we conducted a laboratory experiment.
This serves two purposes. First, it is used to explore the trade-o¤ between mission
and prot at the heart of the model. Second, to establish empirically the degree
of heterogeneous motivation among participants to investigate to what extent there
exist motivated agents who balance money and mission in the lab. We found that 8%
of the population always choose to donate their earnings, even when their donations
had lower monetary value than what they could keep as earnings, about 18% choose
to donate when the monetary value of donations exceed what they can keep as
earnings, but not otherwise. The remaining 74% of the population appear to behave
more like homo economicus, namely, they always kept their money as earnings. We
use the experimental ndings to calibrate the model to the data in order to examine
a matching model of rm formation. This allows us to assess, for our experimental
population, how far social enterprises will emerge in a competitive market place. We
nd around 10% e¢ ciency gains when individuals whose degree of motivation would
achieve mission integrity work in social enterprises rather than non-prots.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses
some related literature. Section three lays out the theoretical framework where rms
employ motivated managers to make decisions which a¤ect prots and some social
objective. In section four, we use the model to compare three organizational forms:
for-prots, non-prots, and social enterprises. We then consider what happens when
organizations compete for managers. Section ve describes the lab experiment that
we use to test some of the core ideas in the theoretical framework and, in section
six, we use this to look at alternative organizational forms and their merits using
the experimental evidence as means of calibrating the model. In section seven, we
discuss the links between the current approach and more standard models of agency.
Concluding comments are in section eight.
2 Related Literature
There is signicant popular discussion of the role of social enterprise in the economy
and these are based on the fact that there are many real-world examples of social
enterprises in both the developed and developing worlds (see Porter and Kramer,
2011). The management literature presents many interesting case studies. For ex-
ample, Lendstreet Financial pursues the social mission of helping indebted people
reduce their debts by delivering nancial literacy programmes and incentives that
encourage responsible repayment. Yet prior to delivering these services to a new
client, Lendstreet purchases the clients debt from institutional investors. When the
client increases their repayment, Lendstreet earns revenue which enables it to sustain
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its operations.3 The commercial micronance sector is another good example where
the social mission of relaxing borrowing constraints of the poor has come head to
head with proting at the expense of the poor, raising the spectre of "mission drift"
(see Yunus, 2011). Ben and Jerrys, is an ice-cream brand which was established
to pursue strong ethical norms alongside more commercial ends. For example, the
ice-cream is manufactured in Vermont using hormone-free milk sourced from local
farms. However, it was eventually sold to Unilever at the behest of shareholders,
raising questions about how far it would continue to be run as a social enterprise.4
In this case, the citizen-manager is the Unilever-appointed CEO, Justin Solheim,
who promised when he was appointed to uphold the history and the authenticity
of the culture and valuesof the rm.
The failure of prot maximization to align with the public interest is a classic
problem of mispricing of inputs or outputs. We view social enterprises as trying
to lean against this by employing decision makers who sometimes consciously ig-
nore price signals. This ties the paper to the growing literature on motivation and
incentives (see e.g. Akerlof and Kranton, 2005, Benabou and Tirole, 2006, Besley
and Ghatak, 2005, Delfgaauw and Dur, 2010, Francois, 2000, and Kosfeld and von
Siemens, 2011). Our paper is particularly close in spirit to Prendergast (2007, 2008)
who shows that for certain types of agency problems, there is a role for hiring mo-
tivated but biased bureaucrats. The general thrust of the literature is that intrinsic
motivation reduces the need to give explicit incentives (e.g., Besley and Ghatak,
2005) but in the current paper, greater motivation mitigates the mission integrity
problem and this allows using higher powered nancial incentives to stimulate e¤ort.
Our paper is also related to the literature on non-prots (Hansmann, 1980, Weis-
brod, 1988, and Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001). A key theme of this literature is that
the non-distribution constraintused by non-prots may be a constrained optimal
choice in the presence of agency problems which are often in the nature of multi-
tasking problems (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) where high powered incentives
can distort allocation of e¤ort away from tasks whose outputs are hard to measure.
This leads to a cost-quality trade o¤; for-prots lowers costs at the expenses of low
unveriable quality whereas non-prots reduce the incentive to shade quality in order
to cut costs. The choice of organizational forms depends upon how much the princi-
pal values quality (or any other non-pecuniary aspects of production) as opposed to
prots. Even though, as we noted above, the potential role of non-prots to attract
motivated managers is recognized (see, for example, Weisbrod, 1988) the formal lit-
erature has not explicitly considered the role of intrinsically motivated managers,
and how their presence and selection interacts with the underlying agency problems.
The paper is also related to the emerging literature among economists on Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility (CSR). Here, we will have a trade-o¤between mission and
prots. In contrast, that literature is largely interested in the possibility that the
pursuit of pro-social ends could enhance protability. For example, in Bagnoli and
3See Lee and Battilana (2013).
4See the discussion in Page and Katz (2012).
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Watts (2003), Besley and Ghatak (2007), and Kotchen (2006), socially responsible
consumers drive this possibility.
Our paper is also related to the literature on delegation and incentives (e.g.,
Aghion and Tirole, 1997). In our model of social enterprise the manager has the
authority to control the mission whereas in a for-prot or a non-prot the mission
is not under the managers control - in the former case, it is to always maximize
nancial returns and in the latter case, it is to prioritize the social mission over any
nancial considerations.
Our lab experiment that is close in spirit to those conducted by Fehrler and
Kosfeld (2012) and Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2012) who investigate how pro-social
mission choice inuences e¤ort. These ideas have also been explored in a eld exper-
iment in Zambia by Ashraf et al (2013). The particular e¤ort task that we employ
comes from Gill and Prowse (2012) who use it to investigate incentives when there
is disappointment aversion.
3 Theoretical Framework
We set out a stylized model to capture the key trade-o¤s which characterize our
approach to social enterprise and its potential role in the economy. The three key
features of our model are managers are motivated ("citizen managers"), the benets
are not purely private - they have a non-rival component, and there are no constraints
on (nancial) residual claimancy (e.g., risk-aversion or limited liability).
The Firm The enterprise produces a good which it sells to customers and on which
it can earn a prot (possibly zero). The good is valued by the consumer but also
has a benet that is external to the rm. It can be valued by the founder (the social
entrepreneur), by workers involved in its production and citizens at large. We will
keep the details of the interaction between the customer and rm in the background.
We have three broad classes of rm-level decision making in mind.
First, there are some goods where the goal is to widen access; education, health
care and legal services are important examples. Tobin (1970) referred to this as
specic egalitarianism. Firms must decide whether it should value access to
certain goods in its pricing strategy. So it could hold down prices and ration access
to deserving individuals. For example, a university might care that students from
disadvantaged backgrounds are admitted or a hospital that values medical care being
available to poor patients. Access to the good in question is the social component
in these examples.
A second case is where there is externality associated with the goods production.
For example, environmental externalities may arise requiring rms to trade o¤ cost
e¢ ciency against social costs. The social component here is the willingness of a rm
to reduce its pollution even if prots are lower.
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A third case is where rms take decisions in markets where consumers face be-
havioral or informational issues. Although this has been popularized recently by
behavioral economics, the idea is much older and is related to Musgrave (1959)s
concept of merit goods. In this case, the rm must weigh up the ethics of exploiting
its information or the frailties of consumers against making a prot.
Our model is not specic to any one of these cases. What the examples have
in common is the fact that the rms decision making matters to the balance of
social and private goals being pursued. And these are attached to production which
has both prot ows and social costs and benets as outcomes. Moreover, there
is a public component to the payo¤ which is non-rival. This contrasts with the
standard agency framework where rewards are pecuniary, and therefore, rivalrous.
Also, this public component is realized only when the manager himself participates
in the production, i.e., her contribution results in payo¤s that are warm glowas
opposed to pure public goods in nature.
Actions The manager takes two actions which we shall call e¤ort e 2 [e; 1], and
mission x 2 f0; 1g where e  0.
E¤ort is modelled as a continuous choice with greater e¤ort creating a rst-order
stochastic dominating shift in payo¤s. Let c (e) be the cost of e¤ort. It is assumed
to have the standard properties: it is strictly increasing and strictly convex. We
also assume that c000 (e) > 0.5 This ensures that the marginal cost of eliciting e¤ort
is increasing.
The parameter  captures a managers ability to supply e¤ort. We normalize
c (e) = 0 . Dene e^ (z) as:
e^ (z) = arg max
e2[e;1]
fze  c (e) =g : (1)
The parameter z is the reward from high e¤ort. It is a combination of some level
of intrinsic motivation (A) and rewards from contributing to society or nancial
rewards. Therefore, z  A:6
Let the managers indirect utility function be denoted as:
 (z; ) = ze^ (z)  c (e^ (z)) = = ze^ (z)  c (e^ (z))

: (2)
Mission choice is a discrete (binary) decision that a¤ects how far social payo¤s are
prioritized. The action has no utility cost. The choice x = 1 is the pro-social action,
where prots are sacriced for the social objective, and x = 0 is the commercial
prot-maximizing action.
5This stronger condition is needed for only Propositions 3 and 4 below and is satised for the
constant elasticity case used in the empirical analysis given our estimate of the elasticity of e¤ort
with respect to rewards.
6Alternatively we could have assumed that it is costly for the agent to supply e¤ort both above
and below some minimum standard level, e.g., c(e) = (e  e)2 :
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Timeline, States, and Payo¤s After the manager is recruited, she chooses e and
this stochastically determines which of two states r 2 fL;Hg occurs where r = H
occurs with probability e and r = L occurs with probability (1  e). The state
r refers to the overall (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) surplus that the rm is able
to generate. After the realization of r there is a further state s 2 fh; lg which is
realized with q 2 (0; 1) being the probability of state h: This state a¤ects the relative
desirability of x = 0 and x = 1 in a way that we make precise below. The realization
of state s is independent of the actions of the agent. When s is realized, the manager
chooses x unless it is contractually specied to be either always 0 or always 1. After
this payo¤s are stochastically realized.
The payo¤s depend on the realized and the mission choice. These payo¤s are
the sum of two components. The rst is nancial prot, which takes two values,
 and 0: The second component is a social payo¤  which takes three values, h; l;
and 0 with h > l > 0. The following table summarizes the payo¤s for all (x; s; r)
combinations:
 With probability e, r = H and then the decision of the agent is given by the
following matrix:
x = 1 x = 0
s = h h 
s = ` ` 
 With probability 1   e, r = L, upon which the decision of the agent is given
by the following matrix:
x = 1 x = 0
s = h 0 0
s = ` 0 0
:
This says that if r = H then it is feasible to generate a prot but this depends
on the choice of x. In particular, if x = 0 then prots are positive but there are no
social payo¤s. But if x = 1 then prots are zero, but depending on s, social payo¤s
can be high or low. In particular, if s = h, which occurs with probability q, choosing
x = 1 yields h while if s = l, which occurs with probability 1   q, choosing x = 1
yields l. If r = L , then only the low prot results independent of the action choice,
and there is no scope for generating a positive social payo¤. Let
 = qh + (1  q) `
denote the expected social payo¤.
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Informational and Contracting Assumptions We assume that the states r
and s, the managers e¤ort e, and the non-pecuniary social payo¤ s (s = h; l) are
non-veriable. Everything else (including x) is contractible.
The two main agency problems in this framework are: (a) upon observing x = 1,
knowing whether the manager succeeded in making the rm protable (r = H) but
chose to pursue the social mission, or whether the manager failed (r = L), because
in both cases observed nancial prots are zero; (b) conditional on succeeding in
making the rm protable (r = H), is the manager choosing the right mission in the
right state of the world (s = h; l).
Hence the use of contractual means to enforce a exible trade-o¤between mission
and prot is limited even though the mission choice (x) and prots ( or 0) are
veriable.7 We restrict attention to organizational forms where either the manager
is a full residual claimant or has a at payo¤.8 Organizations will also di¤er in terms
of whether the manager has the authority to choose x or whether it is xed by the
founder.
We focus on three possible organizational forms: (i) (FP) a for-prot with a
rigid mission of prot-maximization (x = 0) but managers are full (nancial) residual
claimants; (ii) (NP) a non-prot with a rigid pro-social mission (x = 1) and managers
are paid a at wage; 9 and (iii) (SE) a social enterprise where the citizen-manager
has control rights over the mission so may choose whether to earn a prot or pursue a
social purpose and are full (nancial) residual claimants.10 Thus, the social enterprise
is a hybrid where there is scope for a exible trade-o¤ between the pro-social mission
and prot.
In each case, managers receive a xed payment from (make a payment to) the
organizations founder to run the rm which we denote by T . The sign of T is not
known a priori. In a for-prot rm, we would typically expect the founder to license
the product to a manager in exchange for a royalty payment so that T < 0. In a
non-prot rm, it would be necessary for the manager to be paid to run the rm
7The model could easily be modied to have a partially informative public signal of the mission-
related payo¤ which could then be used in the contract o¤ered to the manager. But selection of
citizen-managers would still be relevant as long as this is imperfect.
8In principle, we could allow for more continuous forms of contracts that make the manager a
partial residual-claimant. This expands the range of parameter values for which social enterprise
strictly dominates non-prots or for-prots but otherwise does not change the main conclusions
qualitatively. Our focus on three discrete organizational forms is driven by our experiment design.
9Our model of non-prot organization follows the literature in emphasising how a non-
distribution constraint ensures that the non-prot mission is not compromised for private gain
(e.g., Hansmann, 1980, and Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001). Here, it ensures that the enterprise is
never tempted to choose a highly protable at the expense of the mission.
10Logically we could allow a fourth possibility, namely, a non-prot where the manager has
control rights over mission. But his mission choice in this case will be driven by non-pecuniary
considerations only (by denition), and so that means the choice will be x = 1. This is assuming
that the manager puts some value weight on the social payo¤, however small. If he derives no value
whatsoever, then he is indi¤erent between choosing x = 0 and x = 1 and in such cases, we assume
he will choose the mission that the founder prefers.
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where T > 0 is a grant or the returns to an endowment which makes the rm viable.
However, managers may also be willing to work below their marketprice if they
are committed to the cause being pursued by the rm. In the limit, they could
either work for free or donate to the organization. In all cases, the level of T will
be determined endogenously by the need to attract managers to the run the rm in
a competitive market setting.
Citizen-Managers We use the term citizen-manager to capture the idea of a
manager who is a motivated agent in the sense of Besley and Ghatak (2005), i.e.
may care directly about the social payo¤.11 This will play a key role in achieving
mission integrity in a social enterprise. We assume that everyone is risk neutral and
that there are no transferability constraints. There is a pool of potential managers
who di¤er in two dimensions. A typical manager i places a weight Mi on the




where G > 0. Manager is competence level is
denoted by i 2 (0;]. Each manager has an outside option, ui, which is determined
endogenously in a competitive recruitment process. We will drop the subscript i
when referring to an individual manager for the remainder of this section to simplify
notation.
For the rest of the analysis we will focus on the following parameter range:
h >  > `: This implies that a manager with motivation M = 1 will make a state-
contingent action choice, along with those for whom M 2 [; ] where   
h
< 1
and   
l
> 1. For such managers, social payo¤s are more important than prots
when r = H and s = h and prots are more important than social payo¤s when
r = H and s = l. Managers with M outside this interval will make a non state-
contingent mission-choice. With M  , they always choose x = 1 and with
M   they choose x = 0. This normalization allows us to dene managers with
 <  as unmotivatedand those with  >  as super-motivatedand those in
the middle as motivated.
In general, the payo¤ of the manager is UM =  (z; )+T and the choice of e¤ort
is given by e^ (z) . Our rst proposition states a useful result that we use repeatedly
below. The proof of this and subsequent results are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 The larger is the payo¤ of the manager conditional on success (z),
the greater is her e¤ort and the higher is her expected payo¤.
The proof follows directly from the properties of  (z; ) and e^ (z). It embodies
the standard logic of residual claimancy in promoting e¤ort incentives. That said,
it is important to bear in mind that z could reect a non-pecuniary payo¤ from
pursuing a pro-social mission.
11See also Francois (2000) and Delfgauuw and Dur (2010) for models which make use of selection
arguments with motivated agents.
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Founders (Social Entrepreneurs) Organizations are established by founders
who are motivated by a combination of prots and social payo¤s. We think of
founders as entrepreneurs who endow the rm with a constitution (an organizational
form) which could specify a rigid mission and recruit managers to run the rm on
their behalf. Even if he delegates running the organization, the founder retains
rights over the idea or the brand that is created which allows her to choose the
organizational form even if he has no direct control over the management of the
organization.
The founders expected payo¤ is
UF = F e^ (z) [qxhh + (1  q)x``]  T
where xs (s 2 f`; hg) is the action taken by the manager in state s. As we noted
above, the xed payment T can be positive or negative.
The parameter F  0, denotes how much the founder cares about the social
payo¤ relative to money. A founder who cares only about money has F = 0 and,
as F increases, the manager cares increasingly about the social cause. Below, we
will consider a world where there are many founders who di¤er in F and compete to
hire managers from the pool in matching market. In section 5, we discuss the more
standard agency case where F < 0.
4 Organizational Forms
This section elaborates the three organizational forms that we study throughout the
paper. For the remainder of this theoretical section, we will consider only variation
in motivation M assuming that all potential managers are equally productive, i.e.
have the same .
For-Prot Enterprise (FP) A for-prot enterprise always sets x = 0, a com-
mercial mission. In this case, M is irrelevant since all rewards to managers are in
the form of private consumption. We assume that the manager is made a residual
claimant on prot. Hence, she will put in e¤ort e^ ( [A+ ]) and her expected payo¤
will be  (A+ ; ) + T .
Non-prot Enterprise (NP) In this case, we assume that the rm always pur-
sues the social mission, i.e. x = 1. Managers will be motivated to put in e¤ort only













Social Enterprise (SE) The mission of the organization is now delegated to the
citizen-manager who has to weigh up the social payo¤ against private payo¤s. In
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e¤ect, she is in a multi-tasking environment, making both a productive e¤ort and a
mission decision. Unlike a non-prot, the rm can choose to return a prot rather
than pursuing a social goal and the manager is rewarded for that decision. And
unlike a for-prot, she is able to forgo prot and do what is good for society should
she chooses to do so.








Msx+ [1  x] 
	
for s 2 fh; lg
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  Ps2fh;lg qs x^  M ; s Ms + (1  x^  M ; s)where qh = q and ql =
1   q. It is the expected payo¤ (social and nancial) when the state is r = H.






















  maxf; Mg with strict inequality holding for M 2 (; ).
From Proposition 1, we know that the higher the marginal payo¤ of the manager
conditional upon success (z), the higher is her e¤ort and her expected payo¤. As
a benchmark, we rst consider an environment where T is exogenously given and
equal for all organizational forms. This can be viewed as autarchy (T = 0) where
the manager is acting independently of the founder. In the next section, we consider
competition for managers. Then, we have:
Proposition 2 Suppose T is exogenously given. For M   the manager is indif-
ferent between a social enterprise and a for prot, but strictly prefers each of them
to a non-prot. For M   the manager will be indi¤erent between a non-prot and
a social enterprise but will strictly prefer these to a for-prot. For M 2  ; , the
manager strictly prefers a social enterprise to a for-prot or a non-prot.
This proposition shows that if managers self-select into organizations without
any compensating adjustments in the xed transfers, then social enterprise dominates
both for-prots and non-prots for all levels of manager motivation, and strictly so
for intermediate levels of manager motivation. The intuition is simple: in a social
enterprise, conditional on success (r = H) the managers expected payo¤ is higher
than that of non-prots or for-prots, and due to this complementarity, she puts in
more e¤ort. For very low and very high levels of manager motivation, managers are
indi¤erent between social enterprise and a for-prot or a non-prot. This suggests
that the scope for social enterprise is most promising for citizen-managers who wish
to tailor the mission to the realization of state s. We have the following:
Corollary The e¤ort level in a social enterprise is (weakly) higher than in a for-
prot or a non-prot, and strictly so for M 2  ; .
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Notice that if the choice was restricted between NP and FP only, then the critical
value of M such that a manager is indi¤erent is M =   ^ which lies between 
and , and FP preferred for M < ^ and NP preferred for M > ^. That is, we have:
Observation There exists ^ such that e¤ort is higher (lower) in a for-prot than a
non-prot for M < ^ (M > ^).
This would be relevant to decide whether the manager is better o¤ working in a
for-prot, and if she wishes, donate her earnings to charity that on average would
yield a value of M rather than working in a non-prot. However, social enterprise
strictly dominates both FP and NP in the interval (; ).
So far we have looked only at the managers payo¤s but not the payo¤ of the
founder. Next, we characterize how the choice of organizational form depends on the
preferences of the founder. We also look at the competitive recruitment process for
managers.
Optimal Choice of Organizational Form We now consider which organiza-
tional form is optimal once we take the founders valuation into account. The joint
surplus of each organizational form factoring in both the founders valuation of the
































1A e^   A+ v  M+   A+ v  M ;  :
For now, we take the matching of founders and managers as given, relaxing this in
the next section.





s ? . However, in the second-best, the choice
is governed solely by managers preferences (in a social enterprise) or can be rigidly
stipulated (in a for-prot or a non-prot). The selection of a manager with a specic
M along with an organizational form are the two instruments at the disposal of the
founder to inuence mission choice as well as e¤ort.
These payo¤s can be used to dene two critical levels of founder motivation which
a¤ect which organizational form is optimal. We dene the parameter space relative













, i.e. as the switch point above which a non-prot yields
greater total surplus when the manager would always prefer to pursue a for-prot
mission. And for M 2  ; , dene  SE  M from SSE   ; M = SNP   ; M, as
the switch point above which a non-prot yields higher total surplus when a manager
in a social enterprise will choose a state-contingent mission.
Using these denitions, we have the following key result:
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Proposition 3
1. For low levels of manager motivation (M 2 [0; ]) there is a level of founder
motivation  FP (M) > 0 above which a non-prot dominates a for-prot which
yields the same surplus as a social enterprise. Moreover, the function  FP (M)




2. For middle levels of manager motivation (M 2  ; ) there is a level of
founder motivation  SE(M) > 0 above which a non-prot dominates a so-
cial enterprise which dominates a for-prot . Moreover,  SE(M) is strictly
decreasing, with  SE() > 0 =  SE().
3. For high levels of manager motivation (M  ) a non-prot yields the same
surplus as a social enterprise, and both of these organizational forms dominate
a for-prot for all F  0:
This partitions the parameter space depending on the level of founder and man-
ager motivation matter. Manager motivation matters in a social enterprise because
it a¤ects which mission will be chosen while founder motivation matters because it
a¤ects how far she cares about the social cause. When manager motivation is low,
then either a non-prot or for-prot is optimal with the former yielding the highest
payo¤ when the founder is su¢ ciently motivated. This has been the focus of exist-
ing theories of non-prots. However, for moderate levels of manager motivation, a
social enterprise can be optimal as long as the manager will choose the correct mis-
sion as e¤ort will be higher than both for-prots and non-prots. Therefore, even
if the founder does not care much about the social cause, a social enterprise will be
preferred to a for-prot. Of course, if the founder cares a lot about the social cause,
then a non-prot will be chosen. There is a complementarity between founder and
manager motivation since a more motivated manager puts in greater e¤ort which
lessens the e¢ ciency loss in a non-prot. When managers are highly motivated,
then motivated founders always choose a non-prot form.12
Competition andMatching Nowwe turn to matching of founders and managers.
T can adjust to ensure that, for an given founder-manager pair, the most e¢ cient
organizational form is chosen. Specically, we study a market equilibrium where
managers match with rms set up by founders who choose an organization form. We
assume types of founders and managers to be observable and also, that preferences
not to be a¤ected by the type of the matched partner (e.g., M does not care about
Fs type). We focus on the implications of stable matching, dened as allocations of
founders and managers which are immune to a deviation in which any founder and
12Note the switch points between di¤erent forms of enterprise are not aligned with the point that
mission preferences of founders and citizen-managers align since manager motivation also a¤ects
productive e¤ort levels.
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manager can negotiate a choice of organizational form and a payment which makes
both of them better o¤. Were this not the case then we would expect re-matching
to occur. This approach can be thought of as the outcome of a competitive labor
market.
For simplicity, we focus on the case of three types of founders and managers,
ranked in terms of how much weight they put on the social mission. Let AF =
ff0; f1; f2g denote the set of types of founders and AM = fm0;m1;m2g be the set of
types of managers. Following Roth and Sotomayor (1989), the matching process can
summarized by a one-to-one matching function  : AF [AM ! AF [AM such that
(i)  (fi) 2 AM [ ffig for all fi 2 AF (ii)  (mj) 2 AF [ fmjg for all mj 2 AM and
(iii)  (fi) = mj if and only if  (mj) = fi for all (fi;mj) 2 AF  AM . A founder
(manager) is unmatched if  (fi) = f i( (mj) = mj). What this function does is to
assign each founder (manager) to at most one manager (founder) and allows for the
possibility that a founder (manager) remains unmatched, in which case he (she) is
described as matched to himself (herself).
The founder and the manager types determine how much the cause is valued
and are denoted by F (f) and M (m) respectively. We assume that F (f0) =
M (m0) = 0; 
M (m2) >  > 
M (m1) > , and F (f2) > F (f1) > 0: This means
that type m2 agents are strongly motivated and will always choose the pro-social
mission, while type m1 agents would achieve mission integrity only if they worked in
a social enterprise. Type m0 agents are completely neutral. The founders of type
f2 and f1 are motivated, the former more than the latter, but type f0 founders are




where  , 2 f0; 1; 2g, i.e. subscripts now refer to the type.
The number of founders and managers of each type is denoted by N (f ) and
n (m) respectively. We study a population where N (f2) = n (m2) and N (f1) =
n (m1), but N (f0) > n (m0). This puts social enterprises and non-prots under
maximum competitive pressure from for-prot rms who will be seeking to recruit
managers and will be willing to bid up managers wages to the point where expected
prot is zero.
Associated with each possible match (f ;m) 2 AF  AM is a choice of organi-
zation form J (f ;m) 2 fFP;NP; SEg and a transfer T (f ;m) when a founder of
type f matches with a manager of type m.
As we saw in Proposition 3, for matched pairs (F1 ; 
M




0 ) either a
for-prot or a non-prot may be the best organizational form, depending on the













either a social enterprise or a non-prot may be the optimal depending on the value





However, the fact that there are some managers who would do what founders
would like in a social enterprise is not su¢ cient to guarantee that social enterprises
would survive as part of a stable matching model of market competition. Once rms
have been founded, they need to be able to recruit managers against competition
from other enterprises. We now give a condition under which there is a stable
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assortative matching where selsh managers and founders match together in for-
prot rms, highly motivated founders and managers set up non-prot rms and
those with middle levels of motivation set up social enterprises.
Stable matching will require one further condition which guarantees that a non-
prot organization values a more motivated manager more than does a social en-
terprise. For this, we need to ensure that e¤ort does not increase too much with
manager motivation in the range M 2 ;  because social enterprises have a strict
advantage in terms of manager e¤ort in this range. A su¢ cient condition for this is
given as part of the following result:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the elasticity of e¤ort at A+  is less than (
A+)l
q(h l) ,
then the unique stable matching equilibrium displays assortative matching, with (i)




and NP otherwise; and,
(iii) J (f2;m2) = NP:
This result articulates the case where we would expect social enterprises to emerge
in matching market against competition from other organizational forms.13 This will
happen precisely when the exible mission is valuable to both the founder and the
manager. Within the specied range, having a more motivated manager is good for
the prospect of having a social enterprise since the e¤ort committed by the manager
will be higher.14
13Our assumption that c000 (e) > 0 implies that the marginal cost eliciting e¤ort is increasing,
which in turn implies that e^ (z) is increasing but concave in z (setting  = 1), as shown in the proof
of Proposition 3. Therefore, the elasticity of e¤ort with respect to reward, namely, "^ (z)  ze^0(z)e^(z) ;









q (h   l) ;










q (h   l) :
A su¢ cient condition for this assumption to hold is (
A+)l
q(h l) > 1 which is easy to verify in
applications including in the empirical application below.
14Our assumptions about the distribution of types of founders and managers implies that all





















, and typem2 agents






: However, they do not automatically ensure that self-selection con-
straints are satised for managers in an assortative matching equilibrium if there is asymmetric
information about managers types. To see this, suppose we start with an assortative matching
equilibrium, and then pull out the managers from two di¤erent organizational forms, say a NP
with the pair (F2 ; 
M




1 ). If their identities are concealed, would
they have an incentive to self-select back into their existing positions? For this to happen both the
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Summary We have developed a model where social enterprises can play a role.
They can recruit managers who are willing to pursue a trade-o¤ between prots and
social purpose. The level of productive e¤ort also matters with more motivated
managers also putting in greater e¤ort. Depending on the levels of motivation and
the matching process, it may be better for a motivated founder to set up a non-prot
or a social enterprise.
5 Quantitative Analysis
The theoretical model highlights the role that motivated agents can play in running
social enterprises. We now breathe life into the approach in two steps. First, we
present results from a laboratory experiment which is designed to test some of the
core trade-o¤s in the theory, showing that there are indeed motivated agents in this
setting and to provide a basis for calibrating the theoretical model. We then use the
calibrated model to explore the parameter ranges in which a social enterprise sta¤ed
by a citizen-manager can survive in competition with non-prots and for-prots.
5.1 The Experiment
The experiment is designed to replicate all of the key features of the theoretical model
and to allow heterogeneity in preferences and ability in the population of participants
to be explored. By randomly assigning organizational choices to participants, we
can test for the way that the two main decisions, e¤ort and mission choice, vary with
organizational form.
The Experiment and Data The experiment was carried out in the LSE Behav-
ioral Lab in May 2013 and drew in participants based on the Labs mailing list.
While students dominate the list, participation was not restricted to this group.
The experiment was designed to capture the theoretical setting as closely as possi-
ble. Details of the experiment are in Appendix C. Here, we focus only on the main
elements that are needed to understand the results.
The participants attended in groups of up to 20 and the experiment took approx-
imately one hour. Before starting, participants were read instructions describing the
experiment which were also available on screen. They were aware that the experi-
ment would allow them to earn money for themselves as well as making donations
to a good cause, the latter being the lab version of a social payo¤. The tasks were
following conditions need to hold:
SSE(F1 ; 
M
1 )  SNP (F2 ; M1 )
SNP (F2 ; 
M
2 )  SSE(F1 ; M2 )
whereas assortative matching only implies that SSE(F1 ; 
M
1 ) + S
NP (F2 ; 
M





programmed in z-Tree see Fischbacher (2007).15 During the experiment, but prior
to undertaking any of the specied tasks, participants were asked to select their
preferred good cause from a list of nine possibilities.16
The e¤ort task follows Gill and Prowse (2012). Each participant is asked to
locate an on screen slider in the middle of a line. We used this task since we were
persuaded that, in contrast to other tasks proposed in a range of experiments to
capture the e¤ect of incentives on e¤ort, it provides a clean measure of e¤ort.17 In
line with previous experiments, we nd persistent heterogeneity in an individuals
ability to perform the task.
As in the model above, e¤ort led to a discrete outcome denoted by success (state
H) or failure (state L). The baseline probability of a successful outcome was 52%.
The participant was asked to position 48 sliders in the middle of a line during a
two minute period with each correctly positioned slider increasing the probability
of success by 1%. After each two minute round, success or failure was determined
probabilistically in accordance with the probability determined by their e¤ort.
As in the theoretical model, in state L (i.e. in the event of failure) there were
no earnings or donations to charity. In the lab version of a non-prot or a social
enterprise, we captured the two states in the model conditional on state H being
realized by o¤ering an opportunity to give to a good cause, a process which was
governed by the realization of an equiprobable stochastic variable  2 fh; `g with
h > 1 > ` > 0 with
h = h and ` = `.
Hence the outcomes fh; `g correspond to the states in the theory above. In the




In a non-prot, proceeds were automatically given to the pre-selected good cause
while in the case of a social enterprise, this was chosen by the participant to mimic
the decision x 2 f0; 1g. In state s = h, the participant in the experiment could
forego private income to give twice his or her earnings to a good cause, while in
state s = `, he or she could could donate only one fth of what should could earn
to a good cause. Following the convention of the theoretical section, we will refer
to participants as female even though in the experiment players of both genders
participated. The observable decision is whether she chose to denote or to keep what
she had earned, i.e., x = 1 and x = 0 respectively.
The experiment ran with 11 two minute e¤ort rounds. We label the practice
round as 0 and analyze the data from rounds 1 through 9.18 In advance of each
15We are grateful for Sam Marden for his excellent programming work.
16The list was: Oxfam, Cancer Research UK, British Heart Foundation, Amnesty International,
LSE Student Hardship Fund, Centrepoint (a London-based charity which helps young homeless),
Mind (support for those with mental health problems), National Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children (NSPCC), Royal Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA),
and World Wildlife Fund.
17See Gill and Prowse (2012) for discussion of the prior literature.
18Here, we do not use the data from round 11 where we allowed self-selection into tasks.
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e¤ort round, the participants were also told whether they were playing for  = 2000
or  = 250: These were point tallies for success or failure which would later be
converted into money.19
Following the practice round, participants faced one of two possible tasks with
the order in which they were faced determined randomly. One was described to par-
ticipants as an earningstask which was intended to capture essence of a for-prot
enterprise in which individuals got to keep the points that they earned. If assigned
that task, each participant completed the earnings task three times consecutively.
The second possibility was described to participants as a givingtask and was in-
tended to capture a non-prot. And it was also repeated three times with success in
the e¤ort task leading to h = 2 or ` = 0:2 with equal probability.
The seventh through ninth round, was described to participants as a hybrid
task. This captured the structure of the social enterprise model in theory above.
Here, the participants performed an e¤ort task after which, if successful, they were
presented with either h = 2 or ` = 0:2 but with a choice between giving their
earnings to charity or keeping it for themselves.
We expect variation in behavior according to the motivation of each participant.
Specically, we can think of each participant placing a weight i on donations versus
private rewards. For Mi = 1, given that  = 1:1, it is not more e¢ cient to keep
ones total earnings irrespective of  donate all of it to charity later. For i > 5,
it will be privately optimal to donate in a social enterprise even if s = 0:2 while
if Mi < 0:5, it will never be privately optimal to donate. In terms of our notation
from the theory section,  = 0:5 and  = 5: In the interval Mi 2 [0:5; 5], individuals
will choose to donate to their preferred good cause only if s = h. By observing
their behavior when they face the incentives of a social enterprise, we will therefore
be able to put bounds on their individual preference parameter Mi .
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In addition to the experimental evidence, we also asked each participant to com-
plete a short survey.21 We collected data on age, occupation, religion, and nation-
ality. Given the nature of the experiment and the context that interests us, we
were also interested in trying to assess participantsdegree of pro-social motivation.
We asked them whether they had volunteered in the past year, whether they had
voted, given to charity, or were a member of a political party. We also followed
Dal Bo, Finan and Rossi (2013) in asking two hypothetical questions regarding a
hypothetical dictator game and receiver game experiment. The details are provided
19Even though in the theoretical section we had a single value for positive prots (), here we use
two di¤erent levels of reward to give us a basis for estimating the elasticity of e¤ort with respect
to rewards.
20In the eleventh round participants were allowed to choose a task. They were randomly assigned
to making one of three binary choices between any of the three tasks: earnings, giving or hybrid.
They then undertook the e¤ort task associated with that choice. Note however that this does not
replicate the matching outcome of the theory where wages are set endogenously. Hence, we do not
use these data in this paper.
21Further details are in the data appendix.
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in Appendix C.
Finally, we used the questionnaire proposed in Perry (1996) to measure public
service motivation. It asks a series of questions using six categories which contribute
towards having an outlook on life which is indicative of greater public service orienta-
tion: attraction to policy making; commitment to the public interest; social justice;
civic duty; compassion; and self-sacrice. All of the individual questions which go
into creating these judgements is based on a ve point Likerscale measured from
1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. From these six underlying categories,
we also created an aggregatez-score for each participant.
At the end of the experiment, the participants for one of the earnings, giving and
hybrid task rounds.22 Which of these rounds they were rewarded for was determined
randomly, by a roll of the dice in the presence of the payment clerk.
Descriptive Evidence We begin by describing some basic features of the data
and experimental ndings. In Table 1, we look at how e¤ort (as measured by the
number of correctly positioned sliders) varies across the tasks. Looking at the raw
data, e¤ort is highest in the hybrid round (social enterprise) and lowest in the giving
round (non-prot).
Table 2 looks at how e¤ort varies by round (excluding the practice round). There
is a pronounced "learning by doing" e¤ect which seems to last around three rounds.
Thereafter, e¤ort seems roughly at over rounds four through six. However, it
picks up again in the nal three (hybrid rounds). Since rounds four through six are
roughly at, it seems reasonable to attribute this to the impact of the organizational
type on choice rather than being due to continued learning. This is view is further
underlined by looking at the cumulative distribution of e¤ort as shown in Figure 1.
Table 3 looks at the decision of whether to choose the pro-social action (donate
to a good cause) or the selsh action (keep as earnings) in rounds six through nine
of the experiment. We break this down by whether s is high (2) or low (0:2). Of
the 468 cases where a mission choice decision was faced 236 were cases where s
is low. There are a number of cases where individuals choose to keep the money
as earnings whatever the value of s. However, there is evidence that individuals
are more willing to take a pro-social action when the rewards of doing so are high.
There are also individuals who pursue the pro-social action even when the charitable
donation that they can make is lower than the private reward that they could earn.
This provides evidence that there is indeed heterogeneity in motivation among the
participants in the experiment in line with the theory.
E¤ort Choice and Incentives In the theory, we focused on heterogeneity in
motivation rather than ability. However, it is be straightforward to allow  to vary
and this turns out to be empirically relevant. Imagine therefore that each participant






reecting their ability and motivation towards
22They were also rewarded for the nal (self-selection) round.
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their preferred good cause. Since we observe multiple e¤ort observations for each
participant, we can obtain an estimate of i. Moreover, we can put bounds on the
value of Mi by observing their donation choice in the hybrid task which replicates
incentives in the social enterprise. We could also, in principle, allow for A to vary
as it would be likely to in the population but trying to estimate this amount of
parameter heterogeneity in our data is not very credible. Hence, below we calibrate
the model to a core case where A is a common parameter across all participants.
The output from the experiment is 9 observations on e¤ort per participant in
the three organizational forms that were assigned, with three observations for each
form. Formally, for each of the k observations for individual i, let eikJ be an e¤ort
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where I  Mi s   1 is the indicator function. Recall that there are two possible
values of rewards when the state is H with k 2 f250; 2000g.
Taking logs, we therefore have
log (eikFP ) =  log (i) +  log (A+ k) . (3)
for e¤ort under a for-prot. With a non-prot e¤ort is:






The term  log (i) will be picked up empirically by including a participant xed
e¤ect in all the specications that we estimate.
Combining (3) and (4), we can run the following regression
log (eikJ) = i + k + J + Dk + "ikJ :
where J = fNP;FPg and J is a dummy variable that is equal to one if J = NP
and zero otherwise; Dk is a dummy variable which is equal to one if k = 2000 and
zero otherwise. Individual and round xed e¤ects (i and k) are included to allow
for the possibility of learning by doing.
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We begin by focusing on the rst six rounds where round and organizational
form are both randomly assigned and hence can be fully separated from each other
by including a full set of round dummy variables. The result in column (1) of Table
4 shows that e¤ort is approximately 4% lower in the non-prot case (compared to
the for-prot case), i.e. where all returns to e¤ort are donated to the participants
selected good cause. This suggests that on average Mi in our sample of participants
was not high enough (recall that if Mi  1 for all players then e¤ort should be higher
under a NP than a FP).
In column (2) we add a dummy for whether the participant is playing for k =
2000 or k = 250 with a dummy variable equal to one in rst case. Participant
e¤ort is 4% higher when the stakes are higher. This makes sense if there are a
number of individuals who do not care about the cause, i.e. Mi = 0 in the theory.
In column (3), we test whether the e¤ect of having a high value of  is di¤erent in
a non-prot situation where rewards are donated to a good cause. However, there
is no signicant di¤erence between the two organizational forms in the data.
The pattern of round e¤ects for the rst six rounds suggest that learning by doing
is exhausted by round 3 with the baseline e¤ort being similar for each participant
thereafter. An F test of the hypothesis that all dummies are the same after round 3
cannot be rejected with a p-value of 0:55. When we control for learning by doing in
this way as reported in column (4), then we nd that the results are virtually identical
to those in column (2) conrming that this more restrictive way of capturing learning
by doing is not a¤ecting the impact of organizational form and higher rewards on
e¤ort. This nding is important since we only have observations in a social enterprise
for round seven onwards due to the design of the experiment.
According to the theory, e¤ort in a social enterprise is given by:













This is predicted to be higher in a social enterprise since there is now a exible
disposition of the resources, in line with our theoretical result.
In column (5) of Table 4, we maintain the hypothesis that all learning by doing
is exhausted beyond the third round of the e¤ort task to estimate the e¤ect of a
social enterprise in which the participant chooses the mission of the organization on
e¤ort choice. Here, we nd a positive and signicant e¤ect of the social enterprise
on e¤ort with e¤ort being around 5% higher.23 This is in line with what we expect
from the theory (recall the Corollary to Proposition 2) where the individuals can
autonomously choose how resources are spent.
23When we run the regressions separately for each organizational form, then we only nd a
signicant e¤ect of high rewards in the for-prot case.
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Mission Choice We now consider the decision over whether to give earnings to
pursue a good cause in a social enterprise by looking at decisions to donate if the
state is H. The theory suggests that this decision follows the following decision rule







donate if Mi  1
keep otherwise.
(6)
Thus, the decision maker is more likely to donate if she is more motivated
towards the good cause that she has chosen. We model this decision empirically
using a linear probability model where
xik = wi + ik + ik
where wi are characteristics of the participant which may capture their pro-sociality,
i.e., are proxies for Mi , ik is determined randomly in the experiment for participant
i after e¤ort has been chosen, and ik is the error term.
Table 5 reports the results. At most a participant could face three rounds in
which they were confronted with this choice but this happened in only 468 out of a
maximum possible 621 cases. In fact only 202 of the 207 participants successfully
reached the stage in the game where a mission choicewas made.
The raw data can be used to calibrate the di¤erent ranges of Mi in our data.
In terms of raw percentages, we nd that around 8% of the population choose to
donate their earnings even only if  = `. In terms of the model such individuals
have Mi  5 and are strongly motivated types. Around 18% choose to donate their
earnings if  = h. They have 
M
i 2 [0:5; 5] and are moderately pro-social. The
remaining 74% of the population have Mi < 0:5 since they always choose to keep
the money as earnings. Thus, the results suggest that there are motivated agents
among those who took are experiment and that, in line with the core idea of the
paper, there is heterogeneity in motivation across the population.
In column (1) of Table 5, we show that if s = 2, then there is a 10 percent-
age point increase in the chance that the participant chose to give the money as a
charitable donation (chose the pro-social mission in the language of our theoretical
model) compared to when s = 0:2.
Column (2) adds as a control whether not an individual has been a volunteer
in the past year as a proxy for Mi . If the answer is "yes", then he/she is 9.4
percentage points more likely to make the pro-social choice. In column (3), we add
their answer to the dictator game question. Here, we nd that a £ 1 increase in their
willingness to give in the answer to that hypothetical dictator game is associated
with a 1.7 percentage point increase in the probability of donating their earnings to
a good cause. The results on the e¤ect of the high donation possibility are broadly
unchanged with the introduction of controls.
Also as a proxy for Mi , column (4) adds their answer to the hypothetical receiver
game. However, in this case the answer has no predictive power. Column (5) adds
the six di¤erent dimensions based on the Perry (1996) scores on di¤erent dimensions
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of motivation. Among these, only the score which measures attraction to policy
making and commitment to the public interest appear to predict a greater likelihood
of giving to charity. However, when we aggregate the measures to form a Perry
z-score as we report in column (6) this is signicantly and positively correlated
with donating to the good cause. A one standard deviation increase in the z-score
(4.6) is associated with a 6 percentage point increase in the probability of giving to
charity rather than taking the money as earnings. Finally, column (7) looks at the
relationship with  when we include individual xed e¤ects, i.e. identify the e¤ect
only by exploiting information on participants who faced the decision to donate in
multiple rounds.
In all of the specications in columns (1) through (7), the coe¢ cient on realizing
s = h, the social state in our theoretical framework, is around 0.1 (10 percentage
points). Thus changing the importance of social rewards versus private rewards does,
in line with theory, have an impact on the behavior of some of our participants.
Our model assumes that income is linear in money so that the size of  does
not a¤ect whether or not to donate earnings to charity. However, if there were
curvature in the utility function with respect to private consumption as well as
donation, then this will not necessarily be the case. Suppose u () is a strictly
concave utility function of private consumption, and w() is a strictly concave








donate if Mi  u()v()
keep otherwise.
(7)
In column (8) of Table 5, we test this linearity assumption by including the size of
the  draw on the decision to donate. The result reported shows that having a high
 makes it around 10 percentage point less likely that a participant in the experiment
chooses to give their earnings to charity. This suggests that marginal utility from
donation falls very fast relative to marginal utility from private consumption or, the
underlying payo¤ functions have some non-standard properties.
Summary Taken together, these results show that the core elements of the theory
seem to appear in a lab setting. E¤ort responds to organizational choice and in-
centives. Moreover, mission choice varies exibly with the importance of the good
cause in the organizational setting which we use to capture our notion of a social
enterprise. Our results are also show that people are heterogeneous in the main
ways that the model envisages: their ability and their pro-social motivation. This is
important for validating the basic ideas in the theory which were based on the idea
of heterogeneous motivations among citizen-managers.
Our next step is to use the empirical ndings to calibrate the model and to use
this to compute the hypothetical market equilibrium in the model. We can then
explore how the motivation of the founder of an organization leads to the possibility
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that social enterprises sta¤ed by motivated agents emerge in a market equilibrium
where rms compete to hire managers on the basis of their ability and motivation.
5.2 Calibration of a Matching Model
Although the experiment does not replicate the matching model or throw any light
on the consequences of the motivation of founders, we can use the calibrated parame-
ters of the model construct this by imagining that the participants in our experiment
constitute a population of potential citizen-managers who can be hired by founders
with di¤erent degrees of motivation. We can then see which levels of founder mo-
tivation would lead to social enterprises emerging as the outcome of the matching
process characterized by Proposition 4.
Core Parameter Values To calculate the total surplus functions, we need to plug




i ; ; A; `; h; ; e
	
. Even with A+ z = 0,
e^ = e. We set e = 0:52 as the lower bound on e¤ort. The values of fl; hg come
directly from the experiment and we will calibrate the model for  = 2000. Estimates
of i are straightforward from the estimates of the participant xed e¤ects in the
e¤ort equation from Table 4. We use the estimates in the column (1) to obtain our
estimate of participant ability.
To estimate Mi we look at the mission choices as studied in Table 5. We will
assign Mi = 5 for individuals who always donate, 
M
i = 0 for those who never donate
and Mi = 1 who only donate when  = h. Thus, we have three levels of pro-social
motivation which we refer to as low, mediumand high. Out of the 207 subjects
in our experiment, we have 157 for whom we assign Mi = 0, 33 for whom 
M
i = 1
and 17 for whom we calibrate Mi = 5.
The nal two parameters that we need are intrinsic motivation A and the e¤ort
elasticity  which we assume to be common across agents for the purposes of our
calibration. There is a large number of studies that suggest that a reasonable number
for  is 0.2.24 We can then estimate the level of intrinsic motivation from
0:043 = 0:2[log (A+ 2000)  log (A+ 250)]
where 0.043 was the estimated coe¢ cient in column 2 of Table 4. This gives an
estimate of A  7000. We will look at the sensitivity of the results to this below.





. The set of potential managers are the 207 individuals who participated in
our experiment. We can compute the total surplus that any match would generate.25
We will use these to solve for the values of F which make any particular match
24This elasticity is similar to those found in other settings such as the eld experiment of Bandiera
et al (2007). As noted in Prendergast (2013) it is also consistent with the ndings in the literature
on taxation and labor supply.
25The exact formulae for these are given in Appendix B.
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. These functions are straightforward to
compute and Appendix B gives the precise formulae that we use.
Social Enterprise versus Non-Prots The theoretical analysis informs us that,
for a social enterprise to emerge as an outcome, it su¢ ces to focus on the participants
in our experiment for whom we have calibrated that Mi = 1. They have the right
degree of motivation to achieve mission integrity in a social enterprise. This was a
total of 33 out of the 207 participants in the experiment. For each of these potential
citizen-managers, we also have an estimate of their ability i.




are in Figure 2. They suggest that there is a role for
social enterprise when F < 4:1 but for values above this, a non-prot will be able
to compete for workers from a social enterprise because it cares more about having
motivated workers. We nd an upward-sloping locus with the switch point towards
social enterprise being higher for more productive workers.
Thus social enterprise does indeed occupy a niche between standard non-prot
and for-prot organizations but works when there is suitable matching between the
managers and founders. Note that the founder of the social enterprise is considerably
more motivated than the managers that they employ. But if the founder were more
highly motivated still, then he would prefer a non-prot.
This quantitative analysis also allows us to see what the percentage increase in
total surplus possible by allowing social entrepreneurs to establish social enterprises
rather than non-prots, assuming that they are matched with managers who have
similar preferences. For this, we take the case where F = 1 and Mi = 1. Then
the gain is measured as
 =
SSE (1; 1)  SNP (1; 1)
SNP (1; 1)
:
Using our core calibration, we measure this benet as between 8% and 12% over the
range of ability that we have estimated for the 33 participants in the experiment for
whom Mi = 1. Thus, for this range of motivation, there do appear to be reasonable
gains.26
The calibration that we have used is based on specic parameter values from the
experimental data. We can assess straightforwardly the robustness of the results to
varying some of the key parameters.
We begin by looking at the elasticity of e¤ort with respect to rewards where the
core results set  = 0:2. We now consider what happens when we halve this to
 = 0:1 and double it to  = 0:4. Since we calibrate the level of intrinsic motivation
based on this, we also have to adjust this to be consistent with the coe¢ cient in
26We also computed the gains for a social enterprise over a for-prot enterprise. These are much
large with an average gain in total surplus of 70%, ranging from around 60% to 100% across the
33 participants.
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column (2) of Table 4. Hence the values that we set are:
 = 0:1 A = 3000
 = 0:2 A = 7000
 = 0:4 A = 15000:
Figure 3 looks at the margin between a non-prot and social enterprise when M = 1.
Now we nd that the di¤erences are quite modest, but increasing the e¤ort elasticity
to  = 0:4 does expand the range under which a social enterprise is optimal quite a
bit.
We now look at what happens when we vary `. We consider lowering ` to 0:1
and increasing it to 0:4. Figure 4 shows the choice between a non-prot and social
enterprise. The critical value of F now seems quite sensitive to having a higher
value of ` with a lower value of ` signicantly increasing the range over which a
social enterprise is better than a non-prot.
Finally, we look at variations in the value of M : We pick M = 0:5 (with the
correct mission choice still chosen when the manager is indi¤erent) and M = 1:5.
The results of doing this are displayed in Figure 5. The e¤ect of this on the choice
of a social enterprise versus a non-prot are quite modest.
These results illustrate, following Proposition 4, that there is indeed a range of
founder motivation consistent with social enterprises which hire motivated agents
as managers emerging as part of a competitive labour market process. Such rms
do not behave like either for-prot or non-prot rms since they use their exibility
coupled with manager selection to balance prots with purposes. Since they respond
to an ex ante surplus-maximizing good cause (since  > 1), they dominate for-
prot production. Also, they achieve e¢ ciency gains, due to both higher e¤ort
and better mission choice compared to non-prot rms. However, some alignment
between founder incentives and manager motivation is needed for them to emerge
endogenously from a competitive matching process.
For-Prot versus Non-Prot Previous discussions of the merits of for-prot and
non-prot enterprise such as Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) have focused on the case
where managers are not motivated, i.e. M = 0. As we have already stressed, there
is no role for social enterprise in our setting since there is no way of achieving the
exible mission which is the hallmark of balancing prots with purpose. Following
the prior literature, our model justies an exclusive focus on the choice between for-
prot and non-prot enterprise. Moreover, we can use our calibration exercise to
explore this quantitatively.
For this case, we compute the function  FP (0), which we dened above as the
critical value of F such that a non-prot is preferred to a for-prot for all F above
this threshold. We get the upward sloping locus in Figure 6 characterizing the
critical F values above which a non-prot will be chosen. The value of F is below
one, so even a modest interest in the good cause will be su¢ cient to establish a
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non-prot in the setting that we studied in the lab. This makes sense since we
have assumed that  > 1 so only di¤erences in e¤ort incentives can make a for-prot
desirable.
Figure 7 considers sensitivity to choosing  = 0:1 or  = 0:4, re-calibrating the
level of intrinsic motivation as above. Observe now that the high elasticity case now
requires a negative value of F to make having a for-prot optimal. This is because,
we need to assume quite a high level of intrinsic motivation to be consistent with
the results in Table 4. Note that the e¤ect of having a lower e¤ort elasticity is not
particularly large.
6 The Case for For-Prot Enterprise
The focus of the analysis so far has been on cases where forgoing prot can generate
unambiguous social gains since the mission is a non-rival good, i.e. F  0 and
 > 1. But, if these conditions did not hold, then the case for for-prot enterprise
(as a rigid mission) is stronger.
Suppose rst that F < 0. Then there is a conict of interest between the founder
and motivated managers which is similar to standard agency models of the rm where
managerial discretion leads to private rent-seeking.27 Founding a for-prot rm now
makes sense as a means of restricting this by creating a rigid mission to pursue prot
maximization. Thus we have:
Proposition 5 For any M > 0 a for-prot will dominate a non-prot or a social
enterprise if F < 0 and is su¢ ciently large.
This result highlights a key di¤erence between the framework of this paper and
standard models of organization. The study of social enterprises and non-prots
makes sense in cases where there is a non-rival cause that founders and managers
wish to pursue.
Making use of the observation in Proposition 5, it should be clear that if F =  5
in our core calibration, then there is never a case for either a non-prot or social
enterprise. This is because even with managers who are strongly committed towards
choosing x = 1, produce a corresponding lossin utility for the founder. However,
with F =  1, there could be a case for a non-prot or social enterprise if they
employ a manager for whom M = 5. This is because the benets to the manager
of the good cause exceeds the loss to the founder, and there is always an e¤ort
advantage of hiring highly motivated managers, even if one does not agree with the
social mission.
Having  < 1, is similar to having F < 0 since the value of the cause favored by
motivated managers is less on average than forgone prots. Founding a non-prot
again restricts the managers discretion to pursue a private surplus-reducing agenda.
27See, for example, Tirole (2006).
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A more subtle possibility arises by considering what happens if the social cause
can also be pursued through government action, as in the standard public economics
literature. This also bears on Milton Friedmans well-known critique of corporate
social responsibility (see Friedman (1970)). He argues that government should
take responsibility for regulating public goods and bads, leaving rms to focus on
prot maximization. If the government were choosing its preferred level of public
goods, then it would optimally reduce its contribution to good causes in response to
private contributions. The result would be complete crowding out, making private
contributions irrelevant. To all intents and purposes, this is like having s = 0 for
all s. In this case, in line with Friedman, only for-prot enterprise would be chosen.
Hence the case for a non-prot or social enterprise as developed here is (implicitly)
premised on government intervention being either rigid or absent in the enterprises
sphere of operation.
7 Concluding Comments
This paper has explored the potential for recruiting motivated agents as a means
of creating social enterprises which balance prot with a social purpose in a exible
way. We have calibrated the model to experimental data and identied the range of
founder and manager motivation for which a social enterprise is a surplus maximizing
organizational form which arises in a competitive setting. The quantitative analysis
suggests that there is a gain of around 10% in total surplus from founding a social
enterprise rather than a non-prot.
The paper has blended a mix of theory and experimental evidence. The latter
has allowed us to calibrate our model and to explore the trade-o¤ between e¤ort
and mission integrity empirically. The core elements of the model are found to have
empirical counterparts in the lab setting. We do nd that there are motivated agents
that are needed to make a social enterprise work but they are relatively scarce. This
is helpful in taking lessons of the analysis beyond theoretical possibilities and into
real world debates. However, the usual issue of external validity of experimental
ndings remains. In future work, it would be interesting to study the interplay of
mission integrity and e¤ort incentives in eld settings and using observational data.
There are other areas where the ideas in this paper are applicable given the impor-
tance of motivated agents. Although not normally classied as social enterprises,
the ideas in this paper can be used to think about the ownership and management
of sports franchises and media outlets. These are both cases where there is a wider
constituency, fans in the case of sports and citizens/politicians in the case of the
media, who care about how the enterprise is run. In both cases, owners own such
enterprises because they too care about success in non-prot terms. In sports, club
like structures were traditionally a means of attenuating the prot motive and in me-
dia some kind of trust based ownership is not uncommon. It would be interesting
to use the ideas here to explore in more detail how ownership and control structures
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a¤ect performance.
In a wider sense, the paper contributes to debates about the right organizational
structures for a market economy and how this is limited by human motivation.28
Protest movements around the world have used the recent nancial crisis to galvanize
discontent about some aspects of market-driven societies. Such sentiments have
been seized upon to denounce economic reasoning, particular in spheres were social
goals matter. On this score, our analysis fuels both promise and pessimism. It is
promising since social enterprise can be used to allow those with certain kinds of pro-
social preferences to express and act upon these as managers of private enterprises.
But it is pessimistic when human nature rather than organizational rules provide a
limit on what can be achieved. Our experiment, perhaps predictably, showed that
those with standard selsh preferences were in the majority. Whether these values
are hard-wired or pliable then becomes a key determinant of what can feasibly be
achieved in a market setting.
28See Besley (2013) for discussion in the context of the critique of markets by Sandel (2012).
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Proof of Proposition 1: Using earlier notation, if z is the managers expected
payo¤(pecuniary and non-pecuniary) conditional on success, then the choice of e¤ort
by the manager is given by e^ (z) and the expected payo¤of the manager by  (z; ) 
T = ze^(z) c(e^(z))

  T: For higher values of z, the value of e^ (z) is higher from the
rst-order condition, and by the envelope theorem, the change in  (z; ) is given by
e^ (z). 
Proof of Proposition 2: There are three ranges of M to consider. For M  ,
the manager will always choose x = 0 under a social enterprise, and therefore, be
indi¤erent between a social enterprise and a for prot. But a non-prot is strictly
dominated. For M  , the manager will always choose x = 1 in a social enterprise.
Therefore he will be indi¤erent between a non-prot and a social enterprise but a
for-prot will be strictly dominated. Finally, for M 2  ; , the manager will
choose x = 1 when s = h and x = 0 when s = l in a social enterprise. In this
case, v(M) = qMh + (1  q) > maxf; Mg. Therefore, the social enterprise is
preferable to the manager to a for-prot or a non-prot. 








is equivalent to the value












 (A+ ) e^((A+ ))  c (e^((A+ )))
= 
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  c  e^((A+ M)):
To minimize notation we set  = 1 in the subsequent analysis so that we have:
(A+ ) e^ (A+ ) c (e^(A+ )) =  A+ F + M e^  A+ M c  e^(A+ M) :
(8)




< 0: totally di¤erentiating (8), we get
dF
dM






For M = 0, the right-hand side of (8) is lower than the left-hand side at F = ,
and therefore,   (0) >  , which lies between  and : At 
M = , M =  
h
<  and
therefore, at F+M = , the left hand side is larger. Therefore, the two sides can
be equal only if F exceeds some minimum threshold, given by  () >











< 0, and   (0) >  () > 0,  (M) > 0 for all M 2 [0; ]:
Therefore, we nd that in the parameter range M  , both FP and NP can
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dominate depending on parameter values. In particular, for any given level of man-
ager motivation M , there is a level of founder motivation  (M) such that for
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  c  e^(A+ M) :
Observe that F qh < F, i.e., the non-pecuniary payo¤ received by the founder is
always lower under a SE than a NP, since the SE chooses a commercial action when




with the strict equality holding only for M = . This is the key trade o¤ between
a SE and a NP.




=  > M. Therefore, a SE strictly dominates a FP.
Therefore, the critical level of F such that a NP dominates a SE, has to be higher









and the total payo¤ conditional on success is the same under a NP and a SE, but
the e¤ort level is higher under a SE. Therefore,  SE() >     >
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M. Therefore, the e¤ort level is the same under a SE and
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< 0 for M 2 [; ] if e^0 (z) > e^0 (z) whenever z > z, that is, e^ (z) is









< 0. As  SE(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> 0 for all M 2 [; ). 
Proof of Proposition 4: Our assumptions on the fraction of each type implies that














independent of F and M and therefore, is weakly supermodular. However, the
maximum of these supermodular functions is not necessarily supermodular. We
proceed to prove positive assortative matching using the following steps:
Step 1 : Consider a function f(F ; M) that is increasing in both arguments. Suppose
it is strictly supermodular, i.e.,
f(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b . Dene a function g(
F ; M) = maxff(F ; M); Cg
where C is a constant:We show that g(F ; M) is weakly supermodular and strictly
so for C < maxff(Fa ; Mb ); f(Fb ; Ma )g. As f(F ; M) is increasing in both argu-
ments, the result is trivially true if C > f(Fa ; 
M
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the result follows. Suppose C < maxff(Fa ; Mb ); f(Fb ; Ma )g. Then we show that
g(F ; M) is strictly supermodular. There are three cases to consider: (i) f(Fa ; 
M
b ) >
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Fb ; 
M





































; (ii) f(Fb ; 
M




b ) for which the proof is
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. A direct corollary of Step 1 is, thatmaxfSSE; SFPg andmaxfSNP ; SFPg
are weakly supermodular, and strictly so for particular cases (which arise later in
the proof).
Step 2 : Consider the pair (Fa ; 
M













Then SNP (Fa ; 
M
a )   SNP (Fa ; Mb ) > SSE(Fa ; Ma )   SSE(Fa ; Mb ) where Ma ; Mb 2

























  e^(A+ M). We want to show this is positive. From the











  M e^0(A + M) = (1  q)     lM e^0(A + M). For




e^0(A + M) < le^(A + M)
for all M 2 (; ). The left-hand side is decreasing in M while the right-hand side




e^0(A + ) < le^(A +







q(h l)) given that that  =

h
. A similar proof holds to establish the
inequality SNP (Fa ; 
M
a ) SNP (Fb ; Ma ) > SSE(Fa ; Ma ) SSE(Fb ; Ma ). So far in the
proof of Step 2 we considered only M 2 (; ). We can extend this argument to the
case where Mb <  while 
M
a 2 (; ) and this would be needed in the proof of case 1
below. This is done by noting that SSE(Fa ; 
M
b ) = S
SE(Fa ; ) while S
NP (Fa ; 
M
B ) <
SNP (Fa ; ). Therefore, S
NP (Fa ; 
M
a ) SNP (Fa ; Mb ) > SNP (Fa ; Ma ) SNP (Fa ; ) >
SSE(Fa ; 
M
a )  SSE(Fa ; ) = SSE(Fa ; Ma )  SSE(Fa ; Mb ).
We now proceed to prove that the unique matching equilibrium involves positive
assortative matching, i.e., a type f founder ( = 0; 1; 2) matches with a type m
( = 0; 1; 2) manager where  =  and some type f0 founders remain unmatched.
Suppose not, and if possible let there be at least one non-assortative match. Since
type m0 managers are scarce relative to type f0 founders, therefore, we cannot have
a non-assortative match such that a type m0 manager is unmatched. There can be
three possible types of non-assortative matches:
Case 1: A type m0 manager can be matched to a type f2 (or f1) founder, and a
type m2 (or m1) manager to a type f0 principal. If there is a non-assortative match
(f0;m2) would be a NP and (f2;m0) would be a NP or FP. As maxfSNP ; SFPg is
strictly supermodular, the non-assortative match is not stable. If they are re-matched
assortatively, i.e, (f0;m0) and (f2;m2), these would be a FP and a NP respectively.
Next consider a possible non-assortative match (f0;m1) and (f1;m0). We know
(f0;m1) would be a SE, but (f1;m0) could be a FP or a NP and (f1;m1) could be a
NP or a SE. These generates four possible cases, of which (f1;m0) being a FP and
(f1;m1) being a SE is easy to deal with by the supermodularity of maxfSSE; SFPg
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(by Step 1). Let us consider the case where (f1;m0) and (f1;m1) are both NPs.
Then we want to show:
SNP (F1 ; 
M
1 )  SNP (F1 ; M0 ) > SSE(F0 ; M1 )  SFP (F0 ; M0 ):
Notice that SFP (F0 ; 
M
0 ) = S
SE(F0 ; 
M
0 ): The result follows as
SNP (F1 ; 
M
1 )  SNP (F1 ; M0 ) > SSE(F1 ; M1 )  SSE(F1 ; M0 )
by Step 2 above, and
SSE(F1 ; 
M
1 )  SSE(F1 ; M0 ) > SSE(F0 ; M1 )  SSE(F0 ; M0 )
by the supermodularity of SSE. Next consider the case where (f1;m0) is a NP and
(f1;m1) is a SE. Then we want to show
SSE(F1 ; 
M
1 )  SNP (F1 ; M0 ) > SSE(F0 ; M1 )  SFP (F0 ; M0 ):
This is true as
SNP (F1 ; 
M
1 )  SNP (F1 ; M0 ) > SSE(F0 ; M1 )  SSE(F0 ; M0 )
by the argument above, and
SSE(F1 ; 
M
1 )  SNP (F1 ; M0 ) > SNP (F1 ; M1 )  SNP (F1 ; M0 )
in this instance. The nal sub-case is where (f1;m0) is a FP and (f1;m1) is a NP.
Then we want to show
SNP (F1 ; 
M
1 )  SFP (F1 ; M0 ) > SSE(F0 ; M1 )  SFP (F0 ; M0 ):
This follows from SNP (F1 ; 
M
1 ) > S
SE(F1 ; 
M




SNP (F0 ; 
M
1 ), the supermodularity of maxfSSE; SFPg.
Case 2: A type m1 manager can be matched to a type f2 founder, and a type
m2 manager to a type f1 founder. We know that (f2;m2) and (f1;m2) would be
a NP, but (f2;m1) could be a NP or a SE and (f1;m1) could be a NP or a SE.
Obviously, if (f1;m1) is a NP then (f2;m1) would be a NP as well. Obviously, if
all four organizational forms are NP, then assortative matching follows from the
supermodularity of SNP . Therefore, let us consider the two interesting cases, where
we want to show, respectively:
SNP (F2 ; 
M
2 )  SNP (F1 ; M2 ) > SSE(F2 ; M1 )  SSE(F1 ; M1 )
and
SNP (F2 ; 
M
2 )  SNP (F2 ; M1 ) > SNP (F1 ; M2 )  SSE(F1 ; M1 ):
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The rst one follows from the fact that SNP is supermodular, i.e.,
SNP (F2 ; 
M
2 )  SNP (F1 ; M2 ) > SNP (F2 ; M1 )  SNP (F1 ; M1 )
and Step 2:
SNP (F2 ; 
M
1 )  SNP (F1 ; M1 ) > SSE(F2 ; M1 )  SSE(F1 ; M1 ):
The second inequality follows from the fact that SNP is supermodular, i.e.,
SNP (F2 ; 
M
2 )  SNP (F2 ; M1 )x > SNP (F1 ; M2 )  SNP (F1 ; M1 )
and SNP (F1 ; 
M




Case 3: A type m0 manager is matched with a founder of type f1 (or f2), a type
m1 (or m2) manager is matched to a type f2 (or f1) founder, and a type m2 (or m1)
manager is matched to a type f0 founder. We can repeat the types of arguments
used above to show that a non-assortative match of the above kind is not stable. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose M =  so that the e¤ort level under a non-
prot is the same as in a for-prot. Clearly, overall surplus in a NP is lower, since
the marginal social payo¤ from success is lower as F < 0. In contrast, if F = 0,
then a non-prot and a for-prot will yield the same total surplus. Extending the
argument, for any value of M > 0, there exists a F < 0 such that a for-prot




=  and so for F = 0, a
for-prot and a social enterprise yield the same surplus, which is higher than that of
a non-prot. But if F < 0, a FP will dominate both. Therefore, for any M 2 [; ]
such that a social enterprise dominates a non-prot and a for-prot for F  0, there
exists a F < 0 such that a for-prot will yield the highest surplus. 
B Calibration Formulae
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i 
which can be computed straightforwardly given values of the parameters as specied.
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C Experiment Details
Stage 1 Stage 1 is several iterations of the real e¤orttask from Gill and Prowse
(2012). In this task participants are faced with a computer screen of 48 sliders(see
diagram below) and have two minutes in order to change the position of as many as
possible from initial position (a) into the correct central position (b).
The number of sliders correctly positioned is the e¤ort outcome. Higher e¤ort
will result in a higher probability of successand hence higher payo¤s. Before each
iteration of the task, we gave the payments associated with success and failure. If suc-
cessful, the participants are told how much they have earned. Round 0 allowed the
participant to practice positioning the sliders without any payo¤s attached. During
subsequent rounds, they were confronted with three possibilities:
1. (non-prot) success triggers a donation to charity which could be either high
or low (greater than or less what they have earned) with equal probability. We
described this as the "giving task".
2. (for-prot) their success gives them an amount that will be banked until the
end of the game. We described this as the "earnings task".
3. (social enterprise) participants will choose between banking the money for
themselves or making a charitable contribution (we will randomly make that
contribution high or low with equal probability attached to each outcome).
We described this as the "hybrid task".
In rounds 1-6, they were confronted with either 1 or 2, each for three rounds with
the order being randomly assigned. In rounds 7-9, only option 3 was o¤ered.
The round order for the tasks is as follows:
1. Participants were told the number of points available if successful.
(a) In the earnings task this is a number of points for the participant.
(b) In the giving task this is two possible donations to charity, both are equally
likely but they only learn which one they are playing for after they have
been successful.
(c) In the hybrid task this is the opportunity to choose between a number of
points for themselves and one of two possible donations to charity. Both
are equally likely, but they only learn which one they are playing for after
they have been successful.
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2. Participants play the slider game.
3. Based on the number of correctly-positioned sliders, whether participant has
been successful is determined.
4. If successful, a reward is earned:
(a) In the earning task this is the number of points as stipulated in (1a).
(b) In the giving task this is a donation to charity depending on one of the
two numbers of points as stipulated in (1b)
(c) In the hybrid task there is a choice between the number of points or the
two possible donations specied in (1c).
5. Unsuccessful participants earned nothing and could make no donation to char-
ity.
(In round 10, participants were asked to complete an additional iteration of the
e¤ort task from stage 1, with one modication: they will now be allowed to choose
one of the organizations from Stage 1 to play again. However, we do not use that data




(a) Age : 1="18-21"; 2="22-24"; 3="25-29"; 4="30-39"; 5="40+";
(b) gender : 0= "Male" 1= "Female"
(c) occupation : 0="Undergraduate Student"; 1="Postgraduate Student";
2="Other Student"; 3="University Employee"; 4="Otherwise Employed";
5="Unemployed, Retired or Otherwise Neither Working or Studying"
(d) nationality 0="British"; 1="other European"; 2="Middle Eastern"; 3="other
African"; 4="Central Asian"; 5="South Asian"; 6="East Asian"; 7="Pa-
cic"; 8="North American"; 9="South or Central American"; 10="Other";
(e) religion 0="Atheist/Agnostic"; 1="Christian"; 2="Muslim"; 3="Hindu";
4="Jewish"; 5="Buddhist"; 6="Sikh"; 7="Other";
2. Volunteering
(a) Have you done any volunteer or charity work in the last year?1="Yes";
0="No"
(b) Have you donated to charity in the last month?1="Yes"; 0="No"
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(c) Do you belong to a political party?1="Yes"; 0="No"
(d) Did you vote in the last election you were eligible to vote in?1="Yes";
0="No";
3. Hypothetical Games
(a) Dictator Game: Suppose you were given £ 10 pounds to split between
yourself and an anonymous other person. How much would you give the
other person? (They would never know who you were).Choice set was
values between 0=£ 0 to 10=£ 10 in £ 1 increments.
(b) Receiver Game: Suppose an anonymous partner had been given £ 10 to
split between you and them. They chose to give you £ 1. You can reject
their o¤er, in which case you both get nothing, or accept their o¤er, in
which case you get to keep the £ 1 (and they keep £ 9). What would you
do?The possible answers were, 0="reject"; 1="accept";
4. Public Service Motivation: Answer to following questions on the Perry (1996)
scale, measured from, 1="Strongly Disagree"; 5="Strongly Agree" (Reversed
means that scale is reversed);
(a) Attraction to Policy Making (5 items)
i. PSM 11 Politics is a dirty word. (Reversed)
ii. PSM 15 I respect public o¢ cials who can turn a good idea into law.
iii. PSM 22 Ethical behavior of public o¢ cials is as important as compe-
tence.
iv. PSM 27 The give and take of public policy making doesnt appeal to
me. (Reversed)
v. PSM 31 I dont care much for politicians. (Reversed)
(b) Commitment to the Public Interest (7 items)
i. PSM 7 People may talk about the public interest, but they are really
concerned only about their self-interest.(Reversed)
ii. PSM 16 It is hard for me to get intensely interested in what is going
on in my community. (Reversed)
iii. PSM 23 I unselshly contribute to my community.
iv. PSM 30 Meaningful public service is very important to me.
v. PSM 34 I would prefer seeing public o¢ cials do what is best for the
whole community even if it harmed my interests.
vi. PSM 37 An o¢ cials obligation to the public should always come
before loyalty to superiors.
vii. PSM 39 I consider public service my civic duty.
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(c) Social Justice (5 items)
i. PSM 18 I believe that there are many public causes worth champi-
oning.
ii. PSM 20 I do not believe that government can do much to make society
fairer. (Reversed)
iii. PSM 32 If any group does not share in the prosperity of our society,
then we are all worse o¤.
iv. PSM 33 I am willing to use every ounce of my energy to make the
world a more just place.
v. PSM 38 I am not afraid to go to bat for the rights of others even if it
means I will be ridiculed.
(d) Civic Duty (7 items)
i. PSM 14 When public o¢ cials take an oath of o¢ ce, I believe they
accept obligations not expected of other citizens.
ii. PSM 21 I am willing to go great lengths to full my obligations to
my country.
iii. PSM 25 Public service is one of the highest forms of citizenship.
iv. PSM 28 I believe everyone has a moral commitment to civic a¤airs
no matter how busy they are.
v. PSM 29 I have an obligation to look after those less well o¤.
vi. PSM 35 To me, the phrase "duty, honor, and country" stirs deeply
felt emotions.
vii. PSM 36 It is my responsibility to help solve problems arising from
interdependencies among people.
(e) Compassion (8 items)
i. PSM 2 I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged. (Re-
versed)
ii. PSM 3 Most social programs are too vital to do without.
iii. PSM 4 It is di¢ cult for me to contain my feelings when I see people
in distress.
iv. PSM 8 To me, patriotism includes seeing to the welfare of others.
v. PSM 10 I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I dont
know personally. (Reversed)
vi. PSM 13 I am often reminded by daily events about how dependent
we are on one another.
vii. PSM 24 I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling
to take the rst step to help themselves. (Reversed)
viii. PSM 40 There are few public programs that I wholeheartedly support.
(Reversed)
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(f) Self-Sacrice (8 items)
i. PSM 1Making a di¤erence in society means more to me than personal
achievements.
ii. PSM 5 I believe in putting duty before self.
iii. PSM 6 Doing well nancially is denitely more important to me than
doing good deeds. (Reversed)
iv. PSM 9 Much of what I do is for a cause bigger than myself.
v. PSM 12 Serving citizens would give me a good feeling even if no one
paid me for it.
vi. PSM 17 I feel people should give back to society more than they get
from it.
vii. PSM 19 I am one of those rare people who would risk personal loss
to help someone else.
viii. PSM 26 I am prepared to make enormous sacrices for the good of
society.
Stage 3 The participants were paid any money that they have banked at stage 1
or 2. A dice was rolled by the participant to determine which round they would be
rewarded for. (Before receiving the payment, each participant was asked whether
they wished to receive their banked earnings in round 10 as a cash payment or
to donate it to charity.) To avoid stigma e¤ects, the participants were assured that
nobody among the participants would know what choice they made. All participants
received an identical brown envelope containing either money or a thank you note
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Table 3: Mission Choice 
 
  
Low β round  (β = 0.2) 
 
High β round  (β = 2) 
 
 























Notes: Data are from rounds six through nine where the participants could choose either to donate or keep their earnings.  There were 207 participants but 




Table 4: Effort  
Variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 


















High π x Non-profit 
Round 
- - -0.011 
(0.031) 
- - 
Social Enterprise Round - - - - 0.057*** 
(0.016) 
High π x Social 
Enterprise Round 
- - - - - 
ID Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Full Set of Round Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes No No 
Restricted Round 
Effects 
No No No Yes Yes 
Rounds Giving and Earning 
(Rounds 1-6) 
Giving and Earning 
(Rounds 1-6) 
Giving and Earning 
(Rounds 1-6) 
Giving and Earning 
(Rounds 1-6) 
Giving, Earning and 
Hybrid (Rounds 1-9) 
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Observations 1242 1242 1242 1242 1863 
 
Notes: The data are for 207 participants over six effort rounds in columns (1) through (4) and nine effort rounds in columns (5) and (6).  The dependent 
variable is the log of effort. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%.  The restricted round effects include four 




Table 5: Choosing to Donate in a Social Enterprise 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
(6) (7) (8) 
High β round 

















Volunteer - 0.086** 
(0.034) 
- - - - - - 
Dictator - - 0.018** 
(0.007) 
- - - - - 
Receiver - - - -0.015 
(0.056) 
- - - - 
Attraction to 
Policy Making 
- - - - 0.054* 
(0.028) 




- - - - 0.089** 
(0.040) 
- - - 
Social Justice - - - - -0.028 
(0.038) 
- - - 
Civic Duty - - - - -0.019 
(0.036) 
- - - 
Compassion - - - - 0.040 
(0.035) 
- - - 
Self-Sacrifice - - - - -0.015 
(0.040) 
- - - 
Perry Z-Score - - - -  0.012*** 
(0.004) 
- - 
High π - - - - - - - -0.137*** 
(0.045) 
ID Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes Yes 
R
2 
0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.53 0.55 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is choosing to give the proceeds to charity in a social enterprise.  Standard Errors (clustered on id) in parentheses: *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.  The number of observations in each regression is 468 with 202 distinct participants.  
6 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative Distribution of Effort by Round  
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